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The purpose of this Article is to consider the role of risk
management in the current financial crisis. In general, risk
management is the practice of assessing and identifying the
different kinds of risks facing a person, an institution, or society
because of its activities and environment, determining the likelihood
of losses and other consequences from those risks, and taking
appropriate actions, which include monitoring the risks and
reducing the losses and other consequences from them. In financial
institutions, financial risk managers, who are part of a risk-
management department or group, are generally charged with
assessing and measuring the risks facing the financial institution as
a result of its activities and the business environment, monitoring
the risks for any change, determining whether the institution has
the resources to deal with the risks, alerting senior managers and
boards of directors about the risk information, and suggesting
courses of action for the institution to take to deal with the risks.
My argument is that risk management in systemically
important financial institutions failed, which contributed to the
recent collapse of the financial system. For a number of reasons
that I shall explore below, risk management did not fulfill its
purpose, which was to prevent financial institutions from suffering
the kinds of losses that they experienced in the crisis. This Article
identifies these risk-management failings and offers remedies to
them.
At times, environmental risk management, which deals with
extreme environmental risks such as global warming,1 inspires my
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I thank Professor Alan
Palmiter and the other participants in the Wake Forest Law Review's
symposium, Corporate Governance and Climate Change, for their comments on
this Article.
1. Global warming is the steady increase in the ambient temperature that
has been occurring since the Industrial Revolution and has accelerated at the
end of the last century into our current one. It is due primarily, but in a
complex way, to human activities that have increased carbon dioxide in the
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discussion of financial risk management. For example, as discussed
below, environmental risk management emphasizes the importance
of "tail risk[s] ,,2 which constitute a cascade of bad events-a
phenomenon that financial risk management did not adequately
account for before the crisis. In addition, the failings of financial
risk management may provide lessons for environmental risk
management. That is, since the financial crisis is upon us, risk
management problems that contributed to it can be identified and
studied. It might thus be possible to identify aspects of risk
management, such as the relationship between risk managers and
senior decision makers, that prevented its practitioners from
fulfilling their role of seeing an approaching crisis and taking
appropriate action (or persuading others to do so) to deal with it.
Understanding risk-management failings in a real-world setting
may provide guidance to environmental risk management, which
faces similar problems in its relationship with political decision
makers.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly identifies the
financial crisis. Part II then discusses the practice of risk
management in financial institutions and identifies its failings as
revealed by the financial crisis. These failings include problems in
risk management modeling, questions about the reliability of the
models themselves, failures to supplement models with other risk
management approaches, governance problems in financial firms
regarding risk management, and imperfect regulatory oversight of
risk management in these firms. Part III considers the lessons that
can be drawn from the financial crisis and identifies improvements
to risk management that would avoid a repetition of the crisis. This
Part also highlights obstacles to risk management reforms, which
include compensation practices in financial institutions and, more
generally, human limitations in dealing with complexity. In
addition, it provides a course of action for risk management in light
of these obstacles.
I. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO IT
We are all now so familiar with the financial crisis that I shall
devote only a few words to it. It was triggered by the collapse of the
credit markets, which was itself caused by losses in asset-backed
securities, initially and chiefly those backed by subprime mortgages
atmosphere, which, among other things, eliminates other protections in the
atmosphere against the sun's warming effect. See generally Nicholas Stern,
Richard T. Ely Lecture: The Economics of Climate Change, 98 AM. ECON. REV.,
May 2008, at 1; Cass R. Sunstein & David A. Weisbach, Climate Change and
Discounting the Future: A Guide for the Perplexed 7-8 (Reg-Mkts. Ctr., Working
Paper No. 08-19, 2008).
2. Robin L. Lumsdaine, Correlation, Models, and Risk Management in
Challenging Times, 7 J. FIN. ECONOMETRics 40, 41 (2009).
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(mortgage-backed securities or "MBSs").3 During a sustained period
of low interest rates, credit was extended widely to enable people to
purchase or to refinance real estate; in the last two years before the
meltdown, there was even an enormous growth in real estate loans
to those with low incomes and little savings and thus with little
hope of repaying those loans unless real estate prices continued to
rise.4 The home mortgage loans were pooled and interests in the
pools were sold by financial institutions as differing kinds of
securities to investors who sought higher returns on debt
investments at this period of low interest rates.5
Once real estate values began to decline, defaults among
subprime borrowers rose.6 This caused a broad reevaluation and
repricing of the MBSs.7 The subprime meltdown and loss of value in
the MBS market caused investors to become suspicious about the
accurate pricing of other asset-backed securities, which led to sales
and thus to falling prices of these securities. A general loss of
liquidity for many of these and other financial assets and a freezing-
up of the market for their issuance resulted. 9 As the value of
financial assets declined, financial institutions found their capital
position weakened and became concerned about the solvency of their
counterparties. 0 They were reluctant to engage in transactions
with, and particularly to extend credit to, other firms because they
3. See Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-
Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13,761, 2008) (comparing
the current crisis to other post-World War II financial crises because it has all
the characteristics of a serious, but typical, financial crisis: a run-up in asset
and equity prices due to capital inflows, slowing economic growth, an increase
in public debt, and a large current account deficit). See generally Faten Sabry &
Thomas Schopflocher, The Subprime Meltdown: A Primer, NERA INSIGHTS,
June 21, 2007, available at http://www.nera.com/image/PUBSubPrimer
_1108.pdf.
4. See generally JOINT ECON. COMM., 110TH CONG., THE U.S. HOUSING
BUBBLE AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: HOUSING AND HOUSING-RELATED
FINANCE (2008).
5. Id. at 17 (explaining that many subprime buyers made little or no down
payments and were unable to afford the mortgage payments, and thus they
depended upon an increase in home prices in order to make the purchase
economically worthwhile).
6. Id.
7. Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 3, at 8.
8. See Ricardo J. Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Musical Chairs: A
Comment on the Credit Crisis, FIN. STABILITY REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE ON LIQUIDITY),
Feb. 2008, at 9, 10 (F.R.G.).
9. Id.
10. See generally TECHNICAL COMM, OF THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS,
FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 16-19 (2008)
(explaining that many MBSs and other asset-backed securities were traded
privately, primarily among institutions, outside organized markets; when
trading stopped, it became difficult for the financial institutions to give an
accurate assessment of their own financial position).
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were unsure about the exposure of these firms to the MBSs." The
subprime meltdown thus triggered a serious crisis in the worldwide
financial system.
Eventually, numerous large financial conglomerates collapsed,
had to be hastily merged with others, or received government
support to survive. Bear Stearns had to be merged with J.P.
Morgan; 2 the federal government seized the two "quasi" banks,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, that funded home mortgages and
guaranteed MBSs; 13 Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, and
Barclays Bank acquired many of its operations, while at the same
time Merrill Lynch, fearful of its future, agreed to be acquired by
Bank of America; and the federal government took over one of the
largest U.S. insurance companies, American International Group,
Inc., because of its massive liabilities from writing credit default
swaps on MBSs. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became
bank (and then financial) holding companies under the direct
jurisdiction of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
("Federal Reserve") in order to avoid becoming the next casualties in
the crisis. 
6
Major legislative and regulatory action was taken to deal with
the crisis. Congress passed, and the President signed on October 3,
2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ("EESA").17
EESA established the Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP"),
which gives the U.S. Treasury the authority to purchase or
guarantee up to $700 billion in troubled assets held by financial
11. Id. at 17.
12. Kate Kelly, Lost Opportunities Haunt Final Days of Bear Stearns, WALL
ST. J., May 27, 2008, at Al; Kate Kelly, Fear, Rumors Touched Off Fatal Run on
Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2008, at Al; Kate Kelly, Bear Stearns
Neared Collapse Twice in Frenzied Last Days, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2008, at Al;
see also Kate Kelly et al., Bear's Final Moment: An Apology and No Lack of Ire,
WALL ST. J., May 30, 2008, at C1.
13. James R. Hagerty et al., U.S. Seizes Mortgage Giants, WALL ST. J., Sept.
8, 2008, at Al.
14. Carrick Mollenkamp, Crisis on Wall Street as Lehman Totters, Merrill
is Sold, and AIG Seeks to Raise Cash, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at Al.
15. A credit default swap is a financial instrument in which, in return for a
one-time payment or periodic payments, the swap writer or issuer agrees to pay
the swap purchaser the value of a debt security if the issuer defaults on
repayment of amounts owed on them. Purchasers and sellers of credit default
swaps may also buy or sell this insurance-like instrument because they are
speculating on the risk of default of the debt issuer. Willem Buiter, The
Magical World of Credit Default Swaps Once Again, FIN. TIMES MAVERECON,
June 14, 2009, available at http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/06/the-magical
-world-of-credit-default-swaps-once-again.
16. See Jon Hilsenrath et al., Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall Street Model,
Become Banks in Bid to Ride Out Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2008, at Al.
17. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343,
122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
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institutions.' Under the authority of EESA, the Treasury
established the Capital Purchase Program, which allowed it to
provide direct capital support to financial institutions. 9 When the
Obama administration took over in 2009, it continued the approach
of shoring up the capital positions of major financial conglomerates,
such as Bank of America. Moreover, the Treasury announced an
ambitious plan, the "Financial Stability Plan," to put financial
institutions and the financial system back on a sound footing. 20 This
Plan included a program of continuing to provide capital to financial
institutions (now renamed the "Capital Assistance Program") and to
"stress test" the largest, most systematically important financial
institutions to ensure that they had enough resources to weather the
crisis (more about this testing later).2' The Plan also included the
development of a program originally envisioned in the TARP, where
private investment funds, jointly owned by private investors and the
government and supported by government loans, would purchase
the troubled MBSs and other assets from financial institutions (the
"Public-Private Investment Program"). 22
II. RISK MANAGEMENT IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ITS FAILINGS
A. Risk Management
Over the past twenty years, risk management has become an
essential function in financial institutions. A sub-discipline of
finance, risk management is intended to help an institution identify
and assess the risk of loss associated with its investments and
activities, monitor and keep in check these risks, and prepare for
and minimize the losses associated with them.23 Risk management
often involves the use of mathematical models to predict the
probabilities of losses on investments and activities and the amount
of these losses on the basis of the past performance of these
investments and activities.24 Thus, risk-management practice often
demands quantitative and statistical skills, and therefore those in
this area generally have mathematical or scientific backgrounds.25
18. Id. §§ 101, 115.
19. Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of the Treasury, Treasury Announces TARP
Capital Purchase Program Description (Oct. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releaseslhpl207.htm.
20. The continuing initiatives under this Plan are described on the Plan's
website at http:www.financialstability.gov. U.S. Dep't. of the Treasury,
Financial Security Fact Sheet 1, http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/fact
-sheet.pdf (last visited June 15, 2009).
21. Id. at 2.
22. Id. at 3.
23. See generally PETER S. ROSE & SYLVIA C. HUDGINS, BANK MANAGEMENT
& FINANCIAL SERVICEs 30 (7th ed. 2008).
24. See generally Anette Mikes, Risk Management and Calculative Cultures
11-16 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 13866.
25. Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement: Were the Measures Used to Evaluate
20091
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One important explanation for the growth in the importance of
risk management is the regulation of capital. Since financial
institutions are highly leveraged (they use other people's money to
make money), their owners have always been required to have some
of their own funds at risk. This capital provides a cushion for the
lenders as well as motivates the owners not to take excessive risks
in their investments and activities. Historically, and even today,
banks and other financial institutions must have a set amount of
capital in relationship to their total assets, which is known as a
leverage ratio.2 6 Over time, however, regulators have also made
capital risk based. This means that a financial institution must
have capital in proportion to the riskiness of its assets and
activities: the riskier an institution is, the more capital it must have,
which means that it may use less borrowed funds for its
investments. The risk-based capital model is an international
agreement promulgated by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision which is then adopted by participatory countries like
the United States.27  The model establishes guidelines for
determining the risks of an institution's assets and activities and
sets basic capital amounts.
Originally, the Basel guidelines, known as "Basel I," focused
only on credit risk, which is the risk that a borrower would default
on its payment of principal and interest, in an institution's loan
portfolio and related off-balance-sheet activities, such as the
provision of a standby letter of credit. 8  Over time, financial
regulators refined the risk-based capital framework to take account
of financial institutions' involvement in hedging activities, such as
futures, interest rate and currency swaps, and other hedging
devices.29 Moreover, as the largest financial institutions began to
engage in securities-market activities, which include purchasing
securities (chiefly debt) for investment purposes and for trading,
capital standards had to take account of market risk. This deals
with the risk of loss of value of the securities due to such factors as
changes in interest rates and securities-market developments.30
This development brought quantitative- and finance-based
Wall Street Trades Flawed?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 26.
26. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 3.6(b) (2008) (leverage ratio for national banks).
27. ROSE & HUDGINS, supra note 23, at 483-84.
28. Under this instrument, a bank agrees, for a fee, to provide contingent
credit to a borrower, such as to pay the borrower's obligations if the borrower
fails to pay them itself.
29. ROSE & HUDGINS, supra note 23, at 487-91.
30. See ANTHONY SAUNDERS & MARCIA MILLON CORNETT, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS MANAGEMENT: A RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 266 (6th ed. 2008).
The most well-known of the methods was the "value-at-risk" ("VaR")
methodology, which purports to determine the probability of loss for particular




practitioners to the forefront of risk management, for finance had
produced methods and techniques for modeling the risks of
securities in order to establish accurate pricing."3 As a refinement
to Basel I, regulators allowed financial institutions engaged in
market activities to develop and use their own methods of assessing
market risk, provided that the methods met certain standards.32
The risk-based capital standards have been reformulated in a
way that gives even more importance to risk management modeling.
The largest, most sophisticated institutions are now allowed to use
risk models in their assessment of credit risks and in a new risk
category of operational risk.33 Under this new approach known as
"Basel II," financial institutions can use mathematically based
credit risk models to measure the credit risks in their loan portfolio
34
and related off-balance-sheet activities. In addition, it allows a
financial institution to use "advanced measurement approaches" for
modeling operational risk (on a quantitative basis), which measure
the risk of losses from such events as fraud (external and internal),
occupational safety, failure to fulfill fiduciary obligations, system
breakdowns, problems in transaction processing, terrorism, and
natural disasters (also at a 99.9% confidence level measured on the
basis of a one-year period).33 Since financial regulators understand
that it does not make sense for every financial institution to engage
in this kind of risk-management modeling, it provides a
"standardized approach" for the enhanced risk assessment, although
one more sophisticated than Basel 1.36
There are other financial risk-management procedures than the
quantitative models. As discussed further below, risk assessment
includes stress testing and scenario analysis. Both of these
31. See generally id. at 268-83.
32. See id. at 288-90. The models were required to use a 99% confidence
level with respect to a probability of loss over a ten-day period. For the market
risk measurement rules for U.S. bank holding companies that were
promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board, see 12 C.F.R. § 225 app. D (2009).
33. The Federal Reserve and the other banking regulators have adopted
guidelines as to credit and operational risk modeling based on Basel II. In the
United States, Basel II began on a three-year transitional basis in 2009 (it thus
generally postdates the financial crisis), with financial institutions computing
their capital in accordance with both old and new standards in a "test" year.
See Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework-
Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288 (Dec. 7, 2007).
34. Id. at 69,292-93 (demanding that risk measurement be made at a
higher confidence level than had previously been required of VaR, that is, at a
one-year measurement level and a 99.9% confidence level).
35. Id. at 69,293-94. The operational risk analysis must rely on internal
data, external data, scenario analysis, and assessments of business
environment and internal controls, with scenario analysis here being expert
judgment and assessment of the "likelihood and loss impact of plausible high-
severity operational losses" in economic-downturn conditions. Id. at 69,316-17.
36. See Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy Guidelines;
Standardized Framework, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,982 (July 29, 2008).
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approaches assess a firm's potential losses by assuming the
existence of very adverse situations or "scenarios," and then by
evaluating how the firm would be affected under the situation and
whether it would be adequately prepared and have adequate capital
to deal with it.37 While mathematical modeling is involved in these
kinds of analyses, they also require a broad historical and
imaginative perspective in order to envisage possible adverse events
and scenarios. To function well, stress testing and scenario analysis
demand experienced persons who, like a devil's advocate,
understand the assumptions and results of the quantitative analysis
of risk and then test them in new directions. Indeed, there may
even be a conflict between two "cultures" of risk management in
financial institutions, one composed of those with confidence in
quantitative risk methods and their results and another consisting
of those who regard them with skepticism and want them
supplemented with risk management based on history and
38
experience.
It should be emphasized here that the risk-management
practices of financial institutions are under the supervision of
financial regulators. For example, the Federal Reserve explicitly
rates bank holding companies on their risk-management practices.
39
Financial regulators are assumed to approve the adequacy of the
quantitative and qualitative risk models used by the institutions
under their jurisdiction.4 ° Indeed, Basel II specifically requires
regulators to supervise institutions' risk management and risk
37. For a discussion of basic principles on stress testing, see BASEL COMM.
ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND STRESS TESTING PRACTICES AND
SUPERVISION 9-11 (2009) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND STRESS TESTING].
Scenario analysis may be distinguished from stress testing insofar as, under the
former, executives in a financial institution may "act out" their probable
conduct and try to anticipate the conduct of others in a stressed environment.
38. See Anette Mikes, Risk Management at Crunch Time: Are Chief Risk
Officers Compliance Champions or Business Partners? 7 (May 30, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138615
(describing the two risk-management cultures as "calculative" and
"judgmental"). She associates scenario analysis with "Holistic Risk
Management," which is more judgment and intuitive oriented, as opposed to
Risk Silo Management, which depends upon VaR. Id. at 15-16; see also Anette
Mikes, Counting Risk and Making Risk Count: The Organizational Significance
of Risk Management 22 (Aug. 9, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1214063.
39. Div. OF BANKING SUPERVISION & REGULATION, FED. RESERVE BD., BANK
HOLDING COMPANY SUPERVISION MANUAL supp. 28 § 4070 (2005) (discussing the
Bank Holding Company Rating System that includes a rating on an "R"
component, which represents risk management). Many of the largest bank
holding companies are "financial" holding companies, which allows them to
engage in a broad range of financial activities. See generally 12 U.S.C. §
1843(k) (2006). The Board is explicitly mandated to inspect the institutions as
to their risks and their risk-management systems. Id. § 1844(c)(2)(A).
40. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, RISK
MODELING: MODEL VALIDATION, OCC Bulletin 2000-16 (May 30, 2000).
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models used in their capital determinations.
Accordingly, sophisticated risk assessment and management
receive the blessing of the law and have thus become an essential
function in a financial firm. In addition, it should be remembered
that risk managers manage the identified risks: not only do they use
their models to predict losses, but they also suggest strategies for
addressing and reducing them. Therefore, risk management could
give a firm a competitive advantage over similarly situated
institutions and could become a profit center for the firm. It allows
a firm to determine with precision the risks of its assets and
activities and to have strategies for dealing with the risks.
Accordingly, if risk management helps reduce an institution's
overall risk, the firm's capital can be used to support more activities
and thus to generate more profits for that capital. Another way of
saying this is that the firm can use greater leverage than its
competitors, which would boost the return on the firm's capital. The
value of risk management, of course, depends upon the accuracy of
its risk assessment. Yet this accuracy, as well as other attributes of
risk management, is called into question by the current crisis.
B. The Failings of Risk Management
The current financial crisis is as much a crisis of risk
management as the corporate scandals of the early part of this
century were a crisis of financial accounting. In that earlier event,
financial accountants, particularly in accounting firms, were too
ready to go along with executives who engineered and profited from
transactions that complied with the form of accounting rules but not
with their substance. The accountants were swayed by executives
who retained them for lucrative consulting services that they
provided in addition to their auditing.12 As a result of the corporate
scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which
greatly enhanced the regulation of accounting firms that audited
public companies and transformed the relationship of outside
accountants with publicly traded firms by making them directly
responsible to the board audit committee, not to a firm's
executives.43
41. ROSE & HUDGINS, supra note 23, at 493. This is the second "pillar" of
Basel II, the first being the new capital-adequacy framework, which uses the
advanced modeling. The third "pillar" is increased market review of a bank's
capital adequacy. Both the first and third pillar rely upon the "external" risk
assessors, which are the credit rating agencies that use risk models similar to
those used internally in the financial institutions. A discussion of these
agencies is beyond the scope of this Article.
42. For a general discussion of the earlier scandal, see JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.,
GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 108-91(2006).
43. For a discussion of how outside accounting firms are directly
responsible to the board audit committee, see JAMES A. FANTO, DIRECTORS' AND
OFFICERS' LIABILITY § 3:3.2 (2d ed. 2005).
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There has been, so far, a similar focus upon risk management
and risk-management professionals in this crisis, although any legal
reforms involving risk management have yet to be formulated
because the financial crisis is ongoing." Risk management in
financial firms is receiving part of the blame for the crisis. 45 It is not
entirely clear how risk management failed in financial firms because
complete information about the institutions involved in the crisis
has yet fully to emerge. However, preliminary evidence exists for
the following criticisms of risk management, focusing upon technical
problems in the risk-assessment and risk-management models. One
complaint is that risk models sometimes used limited or even
inappropriate data. 6 That is, since the models rely upon historical
data to predict the probability and amount of future losses, the
predictions can be unreliable if the data used was from the
performance of securities or other assets in the period before the
crisis, which was one of low volatility. In other words, the data was
not sufficiently historical or representative. 4
A related criticism is that risk models were used to estimate the
loss probabilities on securities for which there was limited historical
data in the first place. 4' The point here is that many of the asset-
backed securities, such as the collateralized debt obligations
44. It should also be noted that there are relationships between accounting
and risk management, since internal control procedures, which are the province
of internal auditing and under the supervision of the audit committee, also
involve ensuring that risk-management guidelines are followed throughout an
organization. See, e.g., COMMITEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE
TREADWAY COMMISSION, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT-INTEGRATED
FRAMEWORK: ExECUTIvE SUMMARY 6 (2004).
45. See, e.g., The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 3-4
(2008) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, former Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys.); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations: Financial Reform to
Address Systemic Risk (Mar. 10, 2009).
46. SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, OBSERVATIONS ON RISK MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES DURING THE RECENT MARKET TURBULENCE 16-17 (2008).
47. Id; see also Financial Regulation: Review of Regulators' Oversight of
Risk Management Systems at a Limited Number of Large, Complex Financial
Institutions Hearing Before Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv., Sen. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 20-22, 24 (2009) [hereinafter
Financial Regulation] (testimony of Orice M. Williams, Dir., Fin. Markets and
Cmty. Inv., U.S. Gov't Accountability Office); Uday Rajan et al., The Failure of
Models That Predict Failure: Distance, Incentives and Defaults 28-29 (Stephen
M. Ross Sch. of Bus. at the Univ. of Mich., Research Paper No. 1122, 2008)
(arguing that risk models of credit agencies used information on loan defaults
for periods when banks held onto the loans and thus used "soft" information
about borrowers in making them). This data proved unreliable as banks began
to securitize loans, for they had less incentive to rely upon the soft information
(since they were no longer holding the loans), but credit rating agencies and
investors continued to rely upon outdated model results. Id.
48. SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, supra note 46, at 16-17.
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("CDOs") and CDOs that had, as pools, other CDOs (this structure
was known as CDO 2) that proliferated in the years before the
meltdown were relatively recent financial innovations. Moreover,
these securities were often divided into classes or "tranches" with
different rights.5 ° It has been reported that, in evaluating risks and
loss probabilities as to these securities, risk managers sometimes
used data from securities that were different from the evaluated
financial instruments (e.g., data about corporate debt used for
determining the risks of asset-backed debt).51 As a result, the risk-
assessment models seriously underestimated the risks of loss
associated with these securities. This model error, as well as the
one involving use of recent data, led financial firms to
underestimate their total risk exposure. Another criticism of the
risk models is that the complexity of many of the asset-backed
securities undermined the proper functioning of the risk models;
that is, the inputs were so numerous that the models did not have
the computational capacity to predict adequately the risks
associated with these securities.
5 2
Other criticisms about risk-management failings in the crisis
are even more serious than the above because they question the
reliability of the risk models. One such complaint is that the models
systematically understate the probability of bad outcomes since they
assume a symmetric distribution of gains and losses, when in fact
the distribution may be asymmetric.53  If that assumption is
incorrect, losses, including serious losses, may occur with greater
probability, which is known as the "fat tails" issue.54 Yet a related
criticism is that the models do not take into account "tail
49. Id.
50. It has been argued that credit-rating agencies, and investors, were
confused by the complexity of the asset-backed securities, which often included
not just loans, but asset-backed securities based on the loans or based on other
asset-backed securities or related derivatives; the complexity was used to
suggest that the movement away from the basic pool of loans made the asset-
backed securities further out on the chain less risky. See Patrick Honohan,
Risk Management and the Costs of the Banking Crisis, NAT'L. INST. ECON. REV.,
Oct. 2008, at 15, 16, 21.
51. SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, supra note 46, at 15.
52. Id. at 13.
53. Id. at 15.
54. See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen, Ten Questions About the Subprime Crisis,
FIN. STABILITY REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE ON LIQUIDITY), Feb. 2008, at 19, 21-22 (2008)
(F.R.G); see also Susan Pulliam, et al., Merrill Upped Ante as Boom in Mortgage
Bonds Fizzled, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2008, at Al (describing how Merrill ignored
risk-management practices to acquire a long position in mortgage-backed
securities and its efforts to reduce that position). For example, one could
contend that the risk-management models of the financial institutions did not
accurately assess the risks of the MBSs and related securities and particularly
suffered from a fundamental underestimation of the risks that an unlikely, but
disastrous, event might occur and that a liquidity crisis would be widespread
and affect all assets equally.
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dependence," which is the risk that a loss in one domain will lead to
losses in others; therefore, losses at the tail of the probability
distribution can be extreme because they produce a cascade of other
losses that then magnify the losses in the original domain that
triggered the cascade.5" An example of tail dependence in the
current crisis was that concerns about defaults in subprime MBSs
caused losses of liquidity in other financial assets and then
threatened the solvency of financial institutions that depended upon
this liquidity.56 Risk models do not reflect this phenomenon since
they focus on probability distributions for financial assets in
isolation from other events. These are significant criticisms, for if
financial institutions underestimate loss probability, they will not
have adequate capital in extreme circumstances.
There are even harsher criticisms of risk modeling. Nassim
Taleb forcefully argues that the models make useless predictions
because they do not foretell the harmful and catastrophic events
that truly matter and that occur in a random way that cannot be
modeled.57 In his view, the catastrophic events are always new and
unimaginable; they are the "black swans. ' ' 8 Moreover, he believes
that risk management actually enhances risk because it leads risk
modelers and their followers to believe that risk is "managed" (an
impossible task), which encourages them to engage in even riskier
conduct, which in turn changes the situation that had been modeled
in the first place. 59 A similar criticism has been articulated by
Emanuel Derman, the former head of quantitative risk strategies at
Goldman Sachs and a professor in the Industrial Engineering and
Operations Research Department at Columbia.65 He cautions that,
unlike models in the "hard" sciences, financial models reveal only
61guesses at causal relationships between data and future outcomes.In his view, the predictive power of the models is undermined by
55. The environmental literature on risk management underscores this
phenomenon. See Carolyn Kousky & Roger M. Cooke, Climate Change and Risk
Management: Challenges for Insurance, Adaptation, and Loss Estimation 2-3
(Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 09-03, Feb. 2009); see also
PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND STRESS TESTING, supra note 37, at 9-10.
56. See PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND STRESS TESTING, supra note 37, at 1-2.
57. NAssIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SwAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE 274-85 (2007).
58. Id. at 281-82. For a journalistic account of Taleb's views on risk
management and his fame in light of his predictions of model failure, see
Nocera, supra note 25, at 27-31.
59. TALEB, supra note 57, at 288-89; see also Francesco Cannata & Mario
Quagliariello, The Role of Basel I in the Subprime Financial Crisis: Guilty or
Not Guilty? 11-13 (Carefin, Working Paper No. 3/09, 2009).
60. Industrial Engineering & Operations Research, Columbia University,
Emanuel Derman, http://www.ieor.columbia.edu/fac-bios/derman/faculty.html
(last visited June 20, 2009).
61. Emanuel Derman, Models, FIN. ANALYSTS J. Jan./Feb. 2009, at 28, 32-
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basic uncertainty about whether the modeled relationships even
exist and by the unpredictability of human behavior. 2 Accordingly,
he believes that while the models can be useful, they must be
constantly checked and revised and ultimately be regarded with
skepticism even by their creators. 3
Aside from model problems, it could also be argued that risk
managers and financial firms failed to supplement quantitative risk
analysis with adequate stress testing or scenario analysis. As
already noted, under these approaches risk managers run
simulations of how a firm would respond to seriously adverse events,
such as the failure of an important counterparty, a significant rise
in interest rates, a shock in the currency markets, or sustained
illiquidity of numerous assets. It appears that in some financial
firms no such testing or analysis occurred, or, if it did, relatively
benign adverse events were used for the tests.64 For example,
although respected economists had warned about the possibility
that the U.S. housing market was in a bubble, 5 many firms did not
run a stress test based upon a serious decline in this market.66 Risk
managers and others failed to take a sufficiently historical or
imaginative perspective in the stress test or scenario analysis, which
might have led them to use scenarios, such as a meltdown in
financial markets, that had previously occurred.67 It could be that
quantitative risk modeling pushed to the side these more qualitative
forms of risk assessment. Indeed, there is evidence that firms
performing better in the crisis did not rely unthinkingly upon
results from quantitative models but evaluated them critically and
in conjunction with other information. 68
62. Id.
63. Id; see also EMANUEL DERMAN, QUANTITATIVE STRATEGIES RESEARCH
NOTES: MODEL RISK 6-7 (1996).
64. See PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND STRESS TESTING, supra note 37, at 8-9
(finding that stress testing was generally done as a mechanical exercise in a
business segment, with little qualitative input from senior management and
little aggregation of testing firmwide; did not include all risks; relied upon
benign situations and failed to anticipate a crescendo of self-reinforcing effects;
and, at the direction of senior management and the board at many banks,
refused to contemplate extreme scenarios in stress testing); Financial
Regulation, supra note 47, at 23.
65. Jonathan R. Laing, The Bubble's New Home, BARRON'S, June 20, 2005,
at 24.
66. Gunter Loffler, Caught in the Housing Crash: Model Failure or
Management Failure 11-12 (Univ. of Ulm, Working Paper, 2008) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1326427. Loffler performs a
stress analysis that risk-management departments should have performed in
2005. This analysis produces a scenario of a housing decline worse than the one
experienced in 2008. Thus, he concludes that either risk managers failed to do
their jobs or that business managers failed to heed risk managers. Id.
67. Id. at 5-7.
68. Nocera, supra note 25, at 50; Dennis Overbye, They Tried to Outsmart
Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, at D1.
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The failure to engage in adequate stress testing and scenario
analysis points to a corporate-governance failing in risk
management in financial firms. Despite the significance of risk
assessment in capital determinations and in financial firm
management in general, risk-management results and even the
risk-management function were not given enough attention by
senior executives and boards of many firms. 9 Most large financial
firms have elaborate risk-management groups and risk
professionals for each business division, as well as a chief risk
officer. 70 However, it is not clear that senior executives always
demanded and analyzed group-wide risk assessments, treated these
results skeptically and required adequate stress testing, and simply
devoted the necessary attention to risk management."
Moreover, it is questionable whether boards of financial firms
adequately fulfilled their supervisory duties over risk management.
Under general practice, risk management may fall under the
jurisdiction of the audit committee since it supervises a firm's
internal controls, and risk monitoring (i.e., ensuring that a firm
stays within designated risks) would be part of these controls.7 2
However, this committee may be overworked in light of the
requirements imposed upon it by Sarbanes-Oxley. 73 Financial firms
often had a separate risk committee, which would approve of a
firm's risk profile.74 Yet it is doubtful whether these committees
were adequately critical and skeptical in dealing with the results
generated by the risk management professionals. That is, risk
managers may have emphasized the comprehensiveness and
predictive power of the quantitative models, and the risk committee
members were content to rely upon the "experts" and not to feel
obligated to understand the complexities and limitations of these
models.75 Moreover, it is likely that board risk committees did not
have outside risk-management experts provide an independent
judgment of the adequacy of a firm's risk-management practices, for
this outside review of risk management is not mandated by law. In
other words, a risk committee might need an outside consultant in
the same way that an audit committee relies upon an outside
69. Financial Regulation, supra note 47, at 18.
70. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 69-70
(Feb. 29, 2008) (discussing the group's risk-management function).
71. SENIOR SuPERvISORS GROUP, supra note 46, at 3, 7-9.
72. FANTO, supra note 43, § 3:29 to 3:30.
73. Id. § 3:14 to 3:49.
74. Matteo Tonello, The Role of the Board in Turbulent Times: Overseeing
Risk Management and Executive Compensation, at 4 (The Conference Bd.,
Executive Action Series No. 292, Dec. 2008).
75. See CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE Two TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY
MONEY, HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH 58 (2008) ("The re-
engineering greatly improved market efficiencies and reduced funding costs but




accounting firm as to a firm's financial statements and internal
controls.16 Furthermore, boards may have felt no need to question
risk-management results because the firms were extremely
profitable and outside parties with expertise in risk assessment, the
credit-rating agencies, agreed with the firms' own risk
assessments.
Finally, financial regulators must shoulder blame for the risk
management failures. As discussed earlier, financial regulators
examine and rate financial firms on risk management, including the
adequacies of the risk-management models. 8 Indeed, they evaluate
risk management with respect to other examination topics. For
example, the financial condition of a firm is examined from the
perspective of its risk profile. 7' Therefore, regulators are expected to
have expertise in risk management in order to judge the adequacy of
the firms' risk-management efforts, even if they do not impose
specific risk management methods or models upon firms. Moreover,
the Federal Reserve even claims that its own supervision is risk
based, as it purports to focus on financial institutions and activities
that pose the greatest risk to the financial system.0
It does not appear that the federal financial regulators fulfilled
their function. It has been reported that they did not question
critically the data used in the quantitative risk assessments, the
adequacy of the models, the seriousness of the scenarios that firms
used to stress test the firm's operations and assets, or the role of
risk management in the firm's governance.8 ' Moreover, when they
did report flaws in the risk management to senior decision makers
of a given firm, they did not insist that firms quickly remedy the
problem or take more serious enforcement action against a firm. 2
Rather, they were content with assertions by firm management that
any problems would eventually be fixed or were not serious in light
of the overall profitability and adequate capital position of the
institution. 3  Indeed, regulators, like firm risk managers,
executives, and board members, did not themselves envision
seriously adverse scenarios and demand that a firm be prepared for
them. 84
76. Id. at 54-55.
77. See Amar Bhid6, In Praise of More Primitive Finance, ECONOMIST'S
VOICE, Feb. 2009, at 2-4, available at http://www.bepress.comI/ev/vol6/iss3/art8.
78. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 40, at 1-2.
79. DIV. OF BANKING SUPERVISION & REGULATION supra note 39, §§
4070.0.4.3.1-4070.0.4.4.
80. See Federal Reserve Board, Supervisory Letter SR 08-9/CA 08-12 (Oct.
16, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2008/srO809.htm.
81. Financial Regulation, supra note 47, at 18-25.
82. Id. at 19-20.
83. Id. at 24.
84. Id.; see also Eric S. Rosengren, President & Chief Executive Officer,
Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Remarks at the ICBI RiskMinds 2008 Conference:
The Global Risk Regulation Summit: "Some Principles to Consider in Future
20091
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
III. LESSONS FROM RISK-MANAGEMENT FAILURE, OBSTACLES TO
REFORM, AND COURSE OF ACTION
This Part briefly discusses the initial lessons from the risk-
management failure in financial institutions. It also identifies
several obstacles to any reform of risk management and proposes a
preliminary course of action for risk management in light of these
obstacles.
A. Lessons
From one point of view, the lessons from the risk-management
failure are straightforward. The shortcomings of the quantitative
models could be fixed. They should use more historical data and
representative data so that their predictions of risk of losses are at
least more accurate on their own terms. Moreover, to the extent
that models (and computing power) allow, they should be modified
to include more variables, such as generalized illiquidity, contagion
of defaults, and asset-price covariance. Indeed, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision is already directing many
technical changes to banks' risk models to deal with model
shortcomings.5
There is also an obvious need to enhance stress testing and
scenario analysis and thus to involve more experienced-based
judgment in risk management. In other words, one lesson learned is
that qualitative risk management must supplement the quantitative
modeling; there cannot be an uncritical reliance upon mathematical
models predicting risk of loss. As financial economist Ren6 Stulz
forcefully argues, those other than mathematicians, for example
economists and historians, must be involved in risk analysis.86 In
discussing the failure of financial institutions to engage in adequate
stress testing and scenario analysis, the Basel Committee on
Regulatory Reform" (Dec. 8, 2008) (observing, in comments upon the financial
crisis, that federal regulators did not anticipate an event where liquidity across
the board would be so significantly disrupted), available at
http://www.bos.frb.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2008/120808.pdf.
85. For example, banks must add an "incremental risk charge" to their
capital with respect to their trading activities in addition to risk charges
determined by VaR models to reflect credit risk in the traded assets. BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: GUIDELINES
FOR COMPUTING CAPITAL FOR INCREMENTAL RISK IN THE TRADING BOOK 6-7 (2009)
(observing that internal models must realistically and conservatively assess
factors such as liquidity, clustering of defaults, credit events among borrowers,
concentrations, etc. in coming up with the charge).
86. Ren6 M. Stultz, Risk Management Failures: What Are They and When
Do They Happen? 18-19, 22 (Dice Center, Working Paper No. 2008-18, 2008)
(emphasizing the importance of an institution's culture in risk management and
the fact that the culture has built within it a risk-management approach that
does not rely just on statistical models, but also on catastrophe scenarios, which
appear more frequently than one thinks and which produce illiquidity,
predatory behavior by multiple parties, and an overall collapse of pricing).
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Banking Supervision prescribes ways of enhancing this testing and
analysis, for example, by using more extreme and imaginative
scenarios, doing the stress test from a firm-wide perspective, and
involving senior executives, boards, and experts directly in the
scenario analysis."7  It also recommends a reverse stress test,
whereby a financial firm is assumed to be insolvent and the purpose
of the exercise is to imagine ways in which this adverse scenario
could come about (and then to prepare for it)."'
From a bank-capital perspective, the crisis arguably came too
soon because Basel II, which enhances risk modeling and stress
testing, had not been implemented in U.S. banks and bank holding
companies, as it is scheduled to be phased in over the next three
years. 8 As noted earlier, the new capital standards enhance goals
for risk modeling, that is, loss predicted at a higher confidence level
at longer periods, and extend the modeling to credit and operational
risks.9 ° Basel II mandates testing of the appropriateness of the risk-
management procedures and systems, which would include "(i)
evaluating the conceptual soundness of the.., systems; (ii) ongoing
monitoring [of the systems with] process verification and...
benchmarking" (i.e., to check their results against results used by
other systems), "and (iii) outcomes analysis" (i.e., to see whether the
models adequately forecast risk; this is known as "backtesting"). 9'
Moreover, Basel II calls for stress testing of the outputs of the
internal models with scenarios that are "plausible" and severe. 92 It
also requires that the board and senior management oversee risk-
management procedures and systems.93 The implementation of the
Basel II in the United States significantly enhances risk
management and may address some of its failings that led to the
current crisis.
94
Another lesson from the risk-management failures is a
corporate-governance one: there must be a greater involvement of
the board and senior executives of a financial firm in risk
87. PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND STRESS TESTING, supra note 37, at 13-14, 17.
88. Id. at 18-19. The Committee also recommends that a financial
institution have a plan for dealing with emergencies and a minimum amount of
liquid assets always available to deal with the adverse scenarios. BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND LIQUIDITY RISK
MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION 4 (2008) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND
LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION]. In this paper, the Committee
recommends that the institution conduct stress testing related to liquidity. Id.
at 24-27.
89. See 72 Fed. Reg. 69,302 (Dec. 7, 2007).
90. Id. at 69,314; see also id. at 69,312 (mandating that credit risk models
use at least five years of data to predict default and economic loss from default).
91. Id. at 69,319.
92. Id. at 69,320-21.
93. Id. at 69,319.
94. This point is also made by Cannata & Quagliariello, supra note 59, at
13-14.
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management. 95  These senior decision makers should supply the
judgment, criticism, and perspective that supplement quantitative
and even qualitative risk management. However, they cannot
provide their insights and supervision unless they are educated
about the risk-management models, procedures, and the
foundational assumptions in them. A positive development of the
crisis is that risk management has become an explicit focus of
corporate-governance practitioners and best practices are emerging
as to what is called "enterprise risk management."96 A board should
understand the basics of the risk models used by a firm, have a
separate risk committee (even an executive risk committee
composed of both executives and board members), have in place
crisis procedures for dealing with risk, and ensure that executive
compensation is keyed to the risk taking of the institution. 97 The
board might want also to consider whether it needs to do a risk-
management audit undertaken by outside experts in the field in
order to evaluate the firm's risk procedures. However, the most
important role for the board is to act as a devil's advocate on risk
issues, for example, by questioning assumptions of the risk
managers and imagining adverse scenarios.
Financial regulators have to improve their supervision of risk
management as well. They do not need more regulatory power on
this issue, for they have now the authority to oversee firms' risk
models and demand improvements in them. 98 They must simply
exercise their authority, particularly when good times reappear. For
example, they must demand that firms remedy their risk
management immediately when they find defects in it, and they
must penalize firms for repeated bad model outcomes, such as by
restricting a firm's activities. 99 Indeed, it is ironic that it took this
cataclysmic financial crisis for financial regulators to engage in a
program of "stress testing" major bank groups so that, in the words
of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, there is a "more consistent,
realistic, and forward-looking assessment about the risks on [their]
balance sheets."'00 Certainly, this stress testing is extraordinary
95. See GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL
STABILITY 41 (2009).
96. Id.
97. See Tonello, supra note 74, at 3-4; see also PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND
LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION, supra note 88, at 33 (for the role
of the board in insisting upon adequately bad scenarios for stress testing);
SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, supra note 46, at 6-10.
98. Financial Regulation, supra note 47, at 3-4.
99. See PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND STRESS TESTING, supra note 37, at 21-22
(urging regulators to monitor banks' stress testing, particularly its forward-
looking nature and involvement of senior management). They must therefore
avoid going along with management's assurance that the problems are not
severe and can be fixed in due course. See Financial Regulation, supra note 47,
at 19.
100. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Secretary Geithner Introduces
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since it is designed to increase market confidence that large
financial institutions will be able to weather the current severe
economic scenario. However, it also shows the proper relationship
between financial regulators and financial institutions on risk
management. The institutions are conducting the tests with their
models, although under assumptions provided by regulators and
with these regulators overseeing and criticizing the operation and
output of the models and supplementing model results with their
own judgments.°1
B. Obstacles and Course of Action
As encouraging as are the potential reforms to risk
management discussed above, there remain serious obstacles to
these reforms coming to pass in financial firms. These obstacles are
compensation in the financial firms and human limitations in
dealing with the complexities of risk analysis in the financial-
institution setting.
1. Compensation
Risk management demands a long-term perspective. Its goal is
to ensure that a financial institution is prepared for, and thus can
survive in the face of, the probable losses that it might experience.
However, risk management is performed by professionals and
supervised by executives and directors whose interests are different
from those of the institution and are generally more short-term in
nature. Compensation is supposed to align the interests of these
individuals with those of the institution. 10 2 The problem is that
compensation in financial institutions, as the financial crisis has
starkly revealed, is based too much on the short term and is
generally insensitive to the risks facing an institution. Employees,
executives, and directors of financial firms are generally
Financial Stability Plan 2 (Feb. 10, 2009), http://www.treas.gov/press
/releases/tgl8.htm. This stress test is designed to see whether a financial
institution has enough capital to survive a severe economic decline and focuses
on banks with greater than $100 billion of assets, which are two-thirds of
holding-company assets today (nineteen institutions). U.S. Dep't. of the
Treasury, Financial Security Fact Sheet 1, http://www.financialstability.gov
/docs/fact-sheet.pdf (last visited June 20, 2009). The point of the tests is to
estimate losses in the credit and market books over a two-year time horizon
(2009-2010) and to evaluate a firm's resources to deal with them.
101. On the methodology of the stress test, see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: DESIGN
AND IMPLEMENTATION 2-4 (2009) [hereinafter DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION]. On
its results, see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., THE SUPERVISORY
CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: OVERVIEW OF RESULTS (2009) [hereinafter
OVERVIEW OF RESULTS].
102. On the theory of compensation in the firm, see generally LUCIEN
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 15-22 (2004).
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compensated on a yearly basis from revenues generated by fees for
the completion of transactions and profits from trading strategies. °3
They receive their compensation primarily in the form of yearly
bonuses that can be enormous in some cases. 04 They are thus not
penalized monetarily if, several years later, a transaction or trading
strategy that generated the fees produces a significant, or even
disastrous, loss for the firm, as occurred in the case of the
structuring of and investments in asset-backed securities.
Moreover, the short-term nature of the compensation encourages
those working in a financial firm to focus on the short term, not to
be concerned with losses that may occur either after they have left
the firm or after they have amassed enough private wealth to be
indifferent to the fate of the institution. They are thus opposed, by
their situation, to risk management with its long-term focus.
Current compensation systems in financial institutions are
therefore an obstacle to risk-management reform. They must be
transformed in order to align better the compensation of financial-
institution employees, executives, and board members with the risks
of an institution. How this could be accomplished is beyond the
scope of this Article and is likely to be difficult, especially since it
must upset the status quo.'1 At the very least, it must answer the
following questions in its implementation: Should an employee be
responsible for losses associated with both expected and unexpected
risks? For how long is he or she responsible for these losses, and
how will the compensation system enforce this responsibility?
Which proportion of his or her compensation should be made risk-
based?
There are preliminary reform efforts in this area. The most
publicized and controversial aspect of recent legislative and
regulatory efforts to support financial institutions has been putting
compensation restrictions on executives in institutions receiving
government aid.106 These efforts are also pushing institutions to
103. See INST. OF INT'L. FINANCE, FINAL REPORT OF THE IIF COMMITTEE ON
MARKET BEST PRACTICES: PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT AND BEST PRACTICE
RECOMMENDATIONS 58-62 (2008) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT OF THE IIF
COMMITTEE ON MARKET BEST PRACTICES]; SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, supra
note 46, at 7.
104. FINAL REPORT OF THE IIF COMMITTEE ON MARKET BEST PRACTICES, supra
note 103, at 58.
105. A good example of the difficulty of changing the status quo is the fact
that even financial institutions that received massive support from the
government to keep them solvent have attempted to continue the pay practices
that led them into difficulty. See, e.g., Liam Pleven et al, The AIG Controversy:
The Logic Behind the Payouts: A Primer, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009, at A2
(discussing background information relating to the payment of controversial
bonuses to AIG executives).
106. See generally James Fanto, No More of "Anything Goes". Executive
Compensation Restrictions Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,
2009 EMERGING ISSUES LExiS 3423, http://law.lexisnexis.com/practiceareas/
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connect compensation to risk management.' °7 For example, the
Treasury requires that the board compensation committee of a firm
receiving government aid must meet annually with risk managers to
look at the relationship between compensation incentives and risk-
management policies. Similarly, financial regulators have
articulated risk-based compensation as a long-term reform once the
crisis is stabilized.'0 9 Moreover, international financial forums have
articulated the need for reform to link compensation in financial
institutions to risk taking."0 Indeed, an international solution may
be called for in compensation, as in the environmental area. Since
individual carbon production can collectively have long-lasting
effects on global warming, the issue must be addressed on a
worldwide basis, so that several parties or countries are not
undermining others' efforts to deal with the problem."' A similar
global solution may be needed so that, as a result of short-term
compensation systems, financial institutions of several countries are
not causing a global financial meltdown.
2. Human Limitations
A second obstacle to improved risk management concerns
human limitations. First, the current large financial groups may
have so many activities and operations that their risks are too
complex to model and control. One has only to look at an
organization chart for one of these groups to consider the difficulties
emerging-issues (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
107. Id.
108. Id.; see also Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §
5221 (as amended by American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L.
111-005, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115 (2009)) (imposing executive compensation
restrictions on firms receiving government support); TARP Standards for
Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,394, 28,398-99 (June
15, 2009) (setting executive compensation standards); U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: ADDITIONAL
ACTIONS NEEDED TO BETTER ENSURE INTEGRITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
TRANSPARENCY 26-27 (2008).
109. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Treasury Announces New
Restrictions on Executive Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/tgl5.htm; see also Deborah Solomon &
Damien Paletta, U.S. Eyes Bank Pay Overhaul, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2009, at
Al (discussing the Obama administration's plans for the reform of
compensation practices in financial institutions); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Treasury, Statement by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on
Compensation (June 10, 2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov
/latest/pressreleases.html.
110. See, e.g., INST. OF INT'L FIN., COMPENSATION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES:
INDUSTRY PROGRESS AND THE AGENDA FOR CHANGE 21-22 (Mar. 2009); see also
Lloyd C. Blankfein, Chairman and CEO, The Goldman Sachs, Group, Inc.,
Remarks at the Council of Institutional Investors Spring Meeting 5 (Apr. 7,
2009), http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/public-policy/speech.pdf (last
visited Aug. 27, 2009).
111. Stern, supra note 1, at 26-33.
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for risk modeling and scenario analysis. 2 Given the complexity of
these institutions and their interconnectedness in the financial
system, which produces added complexities, it may be inevitable
that some risks will grow undetected and result in a serious threat
to the financial system, as has been the case in the current crisis.1
3
If, as has happened, financial institutions continue to expand their
activities, the financial system may be prone to repeated
catastrophes."' Simply put, no risk manager, executive, board of
directors, or regulator can understand all the risks of a financial
group.
This complexity perspective suggests that quantitative risk
management, even if enhanced by stress testing and other
qualitative approaches, can be dangerous because it gives those in
financial institutions and financial regulators the illusion that they
have identified and controlled risks. Although they do not know the
exact amount of the losses, they believe that they know the causes of
them: these are the "known unknowns.""' However, if financial-
market complexities produce new situations of risk that may have
little to do with model outcomes, risk assessment and measurement
may aggravate the situations because they change the conduct of
parties who believe that they have already prepared for the worst."6
112. See, e.g., GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 95, at 40 (noting that if there is
no adequate risk management, a firm should reduce its size and complexity); id.
at 26-27 (pointing out that the largest financial institutions in the United
States are becoming even larger, posing greater systemic risk to the financial
system and creating complexity: "[i]s it really possible, with all the complexities,
risks, and potential conflicts, that even the most dedicated board of directors
and top management can understand and maintain control over such a diverse
and complex mix of activities?").
113. Luisa Fernandez et al., On Democratizing Financial Turmoil: A
Minskian Analysis of the Subprime Crisis 24 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll.,
Working Paper No. 548, 2008) (contending that the crisis is an example of the
inherent instability of the financial system which occurred because the system
offered funds to the poor in massive amounts and then spread the risk of failure
throughout the financial system through Wall Street efforts).
114. See RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS,
HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 255-60 (2007).
115. See GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES: CENTRAL BANKS,
CREDIT BUBBLES AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET FALLACY 144 (2008) (explaining
that this is the situation where the probability distributions for assets are
stable).
116. Id. at 147-48 (pointing out how past data (which deals with one
economic cycle) may be totally unrepresentative of another cycle, and, more
importantly, may not at all be predictive of what occurs in extreme
circumstances, and that risk management in these circumstances gives market
participants a false sense of security and adds to the instability of the system
because when one is in a "unknown known" situation one acts as if one is in a
"known unknown" scenario); see also Bhid6, supra note 77, at 3-4 (contending
that, fooled by the spurious predictability of models of rational markets, banks
have been encouraged to engage in all kinds of risky activities and are becoming
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In other words, rather than being in the predicted and predictable
state of affairs, financial institutions are presented with "unknown
knowns" as a result of complexities. This is Taleb's "black swan"
moment, which risk management both aggravated and could not
predict. 117
A second human limitations argument (which has implications
in the environmental area) is the human inability to acknowledge
and thus to take action on the basis of truly adverse scenarios. Even
if risk management were able to predict losses in complex financial
institutions, the questions would be whether we would test the
systems with sufficiently negative scenarios and whether we would
take the required action to prepare for these negative outcomes,
particularly when they are in the future and the present financial
situation is good. There is an extensive psychological literature
suggesting that human beings can be excessively optimistic, refuse
to acknowledge properly the risk of loss, and focus too much on
present or visible issues (even if statistically insignificant). 118 From
a social psychological perspective, moreover, our participation in
groups and organizations may reinforce these tendencies because
group members may be reluctant to express views at odds with the
group's dominant perspective. 9 In other words, although in the
middle of the financial crisis, as now, we are alert to risks of loss,
memories of the crisis will fade in good times and concerns about
catastrophic risks will be less vivid.
2 0
A good example of the unwillingness to imagine and to act upon
extremely adverse scenarios is the stress testing that financial
regulators conducted on the major financial institutions.'2  The
regulators required the institutions to run tests under a "baseline"
and "more adverse" scenario.'2 2 However, the latter scenario only
assumed for the worst scenario over the next two years -3.3% real
GDP growth, 10.3% unemployment, and an approximately 22%
decline in home prices.123 In short, even in the middle of one of the
worst financial catastrophes in decades, financial regulators could
not even assume an extremely adverse scenario for planning
purposes. It is no surprise, therefore, that it is so difficult to
convince people, and political leaders, that a human catastrophe
awaits them some fifty years in the future as a result of global
warming.
117. See COOPER, supra note 115, at 147-48.
118. See generally BEHAVIORAL LAw & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000).
119. See S. ALEXANDER HASLAM, PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE SOCIAL
IDENTITY APPROACH 99-106 (2d ed. 2004).
120. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE 155 (2005).
121. See DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 101, at 1-2.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 6.
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3. Recommended Course of Action
What is the proper course of action for risk management in
financial institutions given these obstacles? Certainly, all of the
reforms discussed earlier-improvements in risk-management
models, enhancements to stress testing, making risk management a
part of corporate governance, and more attention of financial
regulators to risk management-should occur and efforts should be
made to make compensation in financial firms more risk-based. Yet
given the complexities of financial institutions and the financial
systems that generate novel risk situations, risk management
should be made "coarser" or simpler. This means that it should be
close to the financial activities that it evaluates and provide
straightforward, forward-looking guidance. 2 4  In the words of
psychologist Gird Gigerenzer, it should be made "fast and frugal" so
that risk managers can respond to new situations of risk; having
detailed plans for every scenario that has been experienced may
prevent risk managers from actually seeing a new risk challenge.1
25
This would argue against excessive reliance upon quantitative
modeling with its complexities, however much the modeling is
improved, and more in favor of a qualitative approach to risk
management that involves personal judgment and assessment.
It may well be that qualitative risk management must also be
accompanied by other action in order to improve risk management.
Finance must be more limited or at least not use all its inventions
until they have been tested extensively. 126 In this vein, several
prominent scholars of finance and economics have called for a
simpler finance. 127 This does not necessarily mean a return to an
earlier regulatory situation where financial activities were
separated into different institutions that could not be affiliated,
although certainly the value of the financial conglomerate must be
reconsidered in light of its contribution to the crisis. Rather, it may
argue for creating at least one banking system that alone receives
government support, that engages in only basic finance, such as
receiving deposits and making commercial loans (and conducting
limited hedging), and that is insulated from more complex financial
activities. 
128
Finally, a course of action for large, complex financial
institutions could be borrowed from the environmental arena.
Environmental risk management argues that redundancies be built
124. BOOKSTABER, supra note 114, at 235-37.
125. GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE
UNCONSCIOUS 20-39 (2007).
126. BOOKSTABER, supra note 114, at 259-60; DERMAN, supra note 63, at 9-
10.
127. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Making Banking Boring, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
2009, at A23.
128. Bhid6, supra note 77, at 6.
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into risk-management systems to address tail risks and the
uncertainty of outcomes." 9 Using this approach in finance would
mean that financial institutions could not engage in new market
activities or sell new financial products without redundant
regulation, such as an adequate capital charge, a developed market
infrastructure, and a regulatory framework that has been used in
the past. 130 This approach would argue that uncertainty, which is
the "unknowability" of risk, requires an extremely conservative and
skeptical approach in the face of risk and an acceptance that risk
never disappears nor is completely managed. Accordingly, in risk
management of financial institutions, we should always err on the
side of demanding redundancies, even if their cost is significant.
CONCLUSION
This Article argued that the current financial crisis
demonstrates a failure of risk management. In doing so, it
explained risk management in financial institutions, analyzed its
failings, considered risk-management lessons learned from the
crisis, and proposed reforms to it. Yet it cautioned that there are
significant obstacles to the reforms, particularly the short-term
nature of compensation in financial institutions and the complexity
of financial activities that pose challenges to risk management. It
attempted to propose a course of action to guide risk management in
financial institutions going forward. The basic lesson here is
borrowed from risk management in environmental analysis, which
argues for building in safeguards and redundancies in anticipation
of unexpected losses in crises.
The risk-management failure in financial institutions leaves
one concerned about the adequacy of preparations to deal with
environmental crises, like global warming. In the financial crisis,
there was an excessive dependence upon imperfect quantitative risk
models, a reluctance to imagine adverse scenarios in stress testing,
a failure of senior decision makers to pay attention to risk
management, often because of a focus on short-term results, and
regulatory passivity when dealing with risk management problems
at a time when the financial industry was profitable and looked safe.
All of these failings contributed to a worldwide financial crisis and
economic hardship. Similar failure in environmental risk
management, however, may well have a more catastrophic outcome.
129. See Kousky & Cooke, supra note 55, at 5-6.
130. Credit default swaps are a good example of the risks posed by new
products without a developed infrastructure.
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